Maine Law Review
Volume 71

Number 1

Article 7

January 2019

Cooper v. Commissioner: Give the Inventor a (Learned) Hand
Rebecca R. Dulik
University of Maine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rebecca R. Dulik, Cooper v. Commissioner: Give the Inventor a (Learned) Hand, 71 Me. L. Rev. 183 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol71/iss1/7

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

COOPER V. COMMISSIONER:
GIVE THE INVENTOR A (LEARNED) HAND
Rebecca R. Dulik
ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUND
A. Income Taxation: Ordinary vs. Capital
B. Section 1235
1. History of § 1235 and Its Treatment in the 2017 Tax Bill
2. Requirements of § 1235
C. Substance over Form Doctrine
III. THE CASES
A. Recent Substance over Form Decisions
1. Summa Holdings & Benenson
2. Mazzei
B. Section 1235 Cases
1. Charlson v. United States
2. Lee v. United States
C. Cooper v. Commissioner
1. Facts and Procedural History
2. The Opinions
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Key Difference Between Cooper and Charlson/Lee
B. Consequences of the Cooper Decision
C. Suggestions
1. Substance over Form Doctrine Should be Applied More Narrowly
2. Congress Should Clearly Speak to Inventions and Capital Gains
Treatment
V. CONCLUSION

184

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

COOPER V. COMMISSIONER:
GIVE THE INVENTOR A (LEARNED) HAND
Rebecca R. Dulik*
ABSTRACT
Among the Internal Revenue Code’s many rules are some taxpayer-friendly
provisions that grant tax benefits. Section 1235 is one such provision, providing to
an inventor preferential tax treatment for income from the sale or exchange of a
patent. In Cooper v. Commissioner, although the taxpayer inventor satisfied §
1235’s requirements, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to deny the
taxpayer § 1235’s benefits. This Note compares Cooper to other § 1235 cases and
argues that Cooper was decided wrongly because of the application of the substance
over form doctrine. The substance over form doctrine is overapplied in general and,
in light of the Code’s decades of development, may no longer be necessary.
Additionally, because taxpayers require clarity in order to arrange their affairs,
Congress should clarify the Code’s new internal inconsistency regarding the
treatment of income from the sale or exchange of patents resulting from the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even
a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
- Judge Learned Hand1

The Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) is a vast collection of rules written by
Congress.2 It also contains legitimate methods for taxpayers to reduce, defer, or
avoid certain types of taxes. As Judge Learned Hand famously said in 1935, a
taxpayer who takes advantage of those Code provisions is not unpatriotic.3 Indeed,
taxpayer-friendly rules are meant for taxpayers.
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS,” “Service”) may disagree with a taxpayer’s
*. J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Maine School of Law. The Author thanks Professor Jeffrey
A. Maine for his enthusiasm about the world of tax law and for his support.
1. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), rev'g 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), aff'd, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
2. See Title 26 of the United States Code. Congress’s power to tax originates in the “tax clause” of
Article 1 of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. For a history of taxation in the
United States and the Sixteenth Amendment, see generally Joseph R. Fishkin et al., The Sixteenth
Amendment, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/amendments/amendment-xvi [https://perma.cc/VV47-SRVX]. Congress in turn gave the
IRS the power to promulgate regulations interpreting the Code. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). Those
regulations are entitled to Chevron deference. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011). This Note does not implicate Chevron deference which applies to
regulations; rather, it discusses litigation techniques employed by the IRS.
3. Helvering, 69 F.2d at 810.
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use of Code provisions, however. Multiple judicially-created tax-abuse doctrines
allow the Service to cry foul on a taxpayer’s tax arrangements.4 While it is important
for the government to be able to collect taxes owed, these doctrines can give the
government an unfair advantage over taxpayers.
In Cooper v. Commissioner,5 a taxpayer arranged his affairs to take advantage
of a Code provision offering preferential tax treatment. Using the substance over
form doctrine, the Service argued that, despite the taxpayer following § 1235’s
requirements, he should be denied § 1235’s benefits. The Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit agreed.6
Taxpayers in cases similar to Cooper’s won their cases. This Note argues that
the key difference between Cooper and those cases was the application of the
substance over form doctrine. This Note first offers some background in Part II on
the tax treatment of ordinary and capital gains income, § 1235’s history and
requirements, and the substance over form doctrine. It also touches on the 2017 Tax
Bill (“Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”) and its implications for § 1235 moving forward. Part
III briefly explores recent cases involving the substance over form doctrine and the
two § 1235 cases referenced in Cooper, along with the facts of Cooper and the
reasoning behind the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV argues that Cooper
was decided wrongly because the substance over form doctrine was erroneously
applied, and that the doctrine should be applied more narrowly in the future, if at all.
As Congress has continued to develop the Code since the inception of the substance
over form doctrine, perhaps it is time to reevaluate the need for the doctrine. This
Note’s conclusion asserts that taxpayers would benefit from more consistency and
clarity so that they can adequately plan their affairs, and that, for the purposes of §
1235, that clarity is already found in the Code.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Income Taxation: Ordinary vs. Capital
The American system of taxation is based on income. Though some exceptions
apply, a taxpayer is generally taxed when she realizes an “undeniable accession to
wealth.”7 The taxable income is then characterized as either ordinary or capital. This
distinction is at the heart of much litigation and this Note. Taxpayers generally prefer
capital gains as they are taxed at preferential rates. 8 If the Code offers capital gain
4. These include the economic substance, sham, business purpose, and step transaction doctrines.
See generally Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859
(1982).
5. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2017).
6. Tax disputes may be brought in a United States District Court, the United States Court of
Federal Claims, or the Tax Court. An appealed decision of the Tax Court is heard by the appeals courts
of the taxpayer’s home state. Here, Cooper is a resident of California and thus, his appeal went to the
Ninth Circuit.
7. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see also I.R.C. § 61 (2012).
8. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012) (reflecting 2017’s top rate of 39.6%). As of 2018, ordinary income is
taxed at a top rate of 37%; capital gains are generally taxed at 0%, 15%, or 20% depending on the
taxpayer’s ordinary income. Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 392 (2018).
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treatment for otherwise ordinary income, taxpayers and their tax attorneys may
structure transactions to satisfy the Code’s requirements.9
Ordinary income includes income from wages, compensation for services, rents
received, and business income whereas capital gains result from income from the
sale or exchange of capital assets. Section 1221 of the Code defines capital assets as
“property held by the taxpayer” but excludes property used in business (e.g.
inventory, supplies, accounts receivable, property subject to depreciation) and selfcreated works.10 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act recently amended the self-created
works exception to specifically include patents.11 Section 1221 currently denies
capital asset designation to “a patent, invention, model or design (whether or not
patented), a secret formula or process, a copyright, a literary, musical, 12 or artistic
composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property” if the aforementioned
item is held by “a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property.” 13
In order to have a capital gain under general characterization principles, a
taxpayer must have made an investment in the capital asset. Even though hard work
is an investment of time and energy, hard work is not an investment in the eyes of
the tax world. In other words, a taxpayer may not benefit from capital gains tax
treatment for income resulting from her time and energy.14 Therefore, income
generated from self-made goods and services is generally treated as ordinary. 15
Section 1235 offers an exception to this rule for income from the sale or exchange
of a patent.
B. Section 1235
Before discussing the mechanics of § 1235, it is worth taking a detour to Capitol
Hill to explore the provision’s history, including implications for its future generated
9. Taxpayers are generally stuck with their choices, however. “[W]hile a taxpayer is free to
organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax
consequences of his choice . . . and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen
to follow but did not.” Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974).
10. I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2012).
11. H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, D(12) (2017) (discussing § 3311 of the House Bill).
12. There is not enough room in this Note to discuss the bizarre treatment of musical compositions.
“At the election of the taxpayer, paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (a) shall not apply to musical
compositions or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in subsection
(a)(3).” I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2012).
13. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2018). Section 1221(a)(3)(B) provides that “in the case of a
letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or produced.”
Section 1221(a)(3)(C) disallows capital asset designation if the item is held by the non-creator but the
basis is the same in their hands.
14. Although an inventor may monetarily invest in her invention, that investment does not create
the kind of investment necessary to achieve capital asset status. The Code may allow deductions under
other provisions for these costs. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 183, 212 (2012).
15. Congress’s intention to disallow capital gain treatment for self-created works is evidenced by
its addition of § 1221(a)(3)’s denial of capital asset designation to artistic or literary creations after
Dwight D. Eisenhower claimed capital gains for income from selling the rights to his book. See Calvin
H. Johnson, Jeffrey H. Kahn & Douglas A. Kahn, Debate on Carried Interest, TAX NOTES, 1597, 1599
(Dec. 11, 2017).
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by the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
1. History of § 1235 and Its Treatment in the 2017 Tax Bill
Although patents are self-created goods, they were not always excluded from
the capital assets definition. In addition, for over half a century, § 1235 specifically
allowed (and still allows) capital gain treatment for income from the sale or exchange
of a patent. These two Code provisions worked together—§ 1221 implicitly defining
patents as capital assets and § 1235 explicitly offering capital gains treatment on
income from the sale or exchange of patents—to create a clear message that patents
were an exception to the self-created goods rule and entitled to preferential tax
treatment.
Before § 1235, income from the sale or exchange of a patent was only available
to taxpayers whose transactions satisfied general capital asset requirements. To
succeed, the patent had to be a capital asset. The IRS had considered patents of
professional inventors inventory and therefore not eligible for capital asset status. 16
When an amateur inventor sold his patent, even having satisfied all of the capital
asset requirements, the IRS only allowed capital asset treatment for lump sum
payments.17 Capital gain treatment originated from the realization that some income
is “produced over a period of years but realized in a single tax year.” 18 Capital gains
rates lessen the taxpayer’s burden in those situations. 19 Because royalty payments
look like rent, the IRS treated them as ordinary income. 20 The Tax Court first granted
capital gain treatment to an amateur inventor in 1946 for royalty payments from the
sale of a patent; the Commissioner did not acquiesce.21
Responding to the Service’s treatment of royalty payments, Congress added §
1235 in 1954.22 Patent sales situations are “so much like rental payments in the
commonplace transactions involving other capital assets that Congress found it
necessary to declare specifically that such transfers are entitled to capital gain
treatment irrespective of the mode of payment.” 23 As an “incentive to inventors to
contribute to the welfare of the Nation,” Congress applied § 1235 equally to amateur
and professional inventors.24 Section 1235 codified the sale or exchange requirement
and additionally supplied the holding period required for a capital gain. 25
Congress recently muddied the status of patents as an exception to the selfcreated goods rule. When the houses of Congress drafted their versions of the 2017
Tax Bill, the House proposed two changes involving patents. The House first
16. See Fawick v. Comm’r, 436 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1971).
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. This thought process can be illustrated in the real estate context: whereas the sale of land results
in capital gain because land is a capital asset, income from rent collected on renting that same land is
treated as ordinary income.
21. Fawick, 436 F.2d at 660.
22. See id. at 659; see also S. Rep. No. 1622 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621.
23. See Fawick, 436 F.2d at 659.
24. S. Rep. No. 1622 at 5082.
25. Id. at 5082-83.
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proposed to add patents to the capital asset exclusions of § 1221 and second, to
eliminate § 1235 altogether.26 The Senate was silent on these two provisions. The
final tax bill adopted the first change to § 1221 but failed to eliminate § 1235.27 Had
both of the House’s suggestions been adopted, income from the sale of self-created
patents would not be entitled to capital gains and this Note would be moot. What
resulted instead is an internal inconsistency leaving confusion in its wake. “Thus, §
1221(a)(3) effectively provides that gain realized on the sale of a patent by its creator
. . . is ordinary gain. At the same time . . . , § 1235 provides that such gain is longterm capital gain, so long as the seller sells all substantial rights to the patent. Both
cannot be true.”28 Whether the inconsistency was an oversight29 or intentional, there
is a now a cloud of uncertainty hanging over inventors.
Despite this apparent contradiction and the uncertainty of congressional intent,
preferential rate treatment may still be available for inventor taxpayers under § 1235
even if § 1221 would deny it.
2. Requirements of § 1235
There are, of course, requirements to receive the benefits of § 1235. Capital
gain treatment is available to “a holder” of a patent when “all substantial rights” are
“transfer[red].”30 A “holder” of a patent can be the creator herself or “any other
individual who has acquired his interest in such property in exchange for
consideration” before the invention was reduced to practice, so long as that
individual is not the creator’s employer or related to the creator.31
To address Congress’s concern about inventors controlling a holding
corporation to which they transferred their patents, it specifically included a control
element in § 1235. Section 1235(c) excludes a transfer of a patent to a “related
person.”32 A “related person” for § 1235 purposes is either a family member or a
corporation.33 Related family persons include only “spouse[s], ancestors, and lineal
descendants.”34 The Treasury Regulations state that a related person “does not
26. H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, D(12)-(13) (2017) (discussing §§ 3311, 3312 of the House Bill).
27. Id.
28. Deborah A. Geier, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: §§ 1221(a)(3)/1235 Disconnect, THE SURLY
SUBGROUP (January 23, 2018), https://surlysubgroup.com/2018/01/23/ [https://perma.cc/K7WV-JJW8].
Other elements of § 1235 must be met to satisfy its requirements. See infra Section II.B.2 for full
explanation of requirements.
29. After all, it was a quick process. See Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill
Passes Senate in 51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html [https://perma.cc/7XMH89FF] (“Republicans in Congress moved with remarkable speed in their bid to enact the biggest tax
overhaul since 1986, unveiling legislation to rewrite the tax code, marshaling support for their effort and
devising a compromise between the House and Senate in under two months.”).
30. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2012). Section 1235 excludes transfers by gift, inheritance, or devise. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1235-1(a) (as amended in 1980).
31. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1)-(2).
32. Id. § 1235(c).
33. Id. § 1235(c)(1)-(2). Section 1235(c) cross references to § 267(b) and § 707(b) with slight
differences. Notably, a related family person is less restrictive under § 1235.
34. Id. § 1235(c)(2).
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include a brother or sister.”35
A corporation is a related person if the holder owns “25 percent or more” of the
entity.36 This percentage was lowered from 50% in 1958. 37 Congress thought that
lowering the percentage to 25 would “prevent possible abuses arising . . . within
essentially the same economic group.” 38 Therefore, an inventor is not precluded
from enjoying § 1235’s benefits if she owns less than 25% of the transferee holding
corporation and her sister owns the rest.39
Despite the clear line drawn by Congress in § 1235’s control requirement, the
IRS has argued that some inventors have too close of a relationship with their
transferee(s) to comfortably satisfy § 1235.40 Congress responded to its concern
about an inventor’s ability to control a transferee holding corporation with § 1235(c),
however, and § 1235(c) does not impose a control test based on the strength of the
inventor’s relationships.
Lastly, a “key consideration” for whether § 1235 is satisfied is the transfer of
“all substantial rights.”41 If less than all substantial rights are transferred, then any
income to the transferor will likely be treated as ordinary. 42 An inventor must
transfer “all rights (whether or not then held by the grantor) which are of value at the
time the rights to the patent . . . are transferred.”43 The regulations offer guidance
about what it means to retain substantial rights, including limiting the scope of the
transfer by geography, field of use, or for a period of time less than the patent’s
remaining life.44 While the regulations do state that retaining the right to terminate
the agreement is a substantial right, 45 the regulations do not focus on control under
the “all substantial rights” element.
C. Substance over Form Doctrine
Even if a taxpayer follows the Code’s requirements, the Service may
recharacterize a taxpayer’s income. The substance over form doctrine has its judicial

35. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(f)(1).
36. I.R.C. § 1235(c)(1); see also Garfield v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 496 (T.C. 2006), aff'd, 290
F. App'x 392 (2d Cir. 2008).
37. Lee v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 945, 950 (E.D. Wis. 1969); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.12352(f)(3).
38. Lee, 302 F. Supp. at 950 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4423).
39. This arrangement “is not considered as transferring such rights to a related person since the
[sister] relationship is to be disregarded for purposes of section 1235.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(f)(3).
40. See infra Section III.B.
41. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing I.R.C. § 1235(a)).
42. See, e.g., Spireas v. Comm’r, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, at *21 (2016).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b); see also Spireas, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, at *23 (citing E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1970)) (The inquiry is “whether [the
taxpayer] has retained rights that, in the aggregate, have substantial value.”).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i)-(iii); see, e.g., Estate of Klein v. Comm’r, 507 F.2d 617, 620
(7th Cir. 1974); Kueneman v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 609, 619 (1977); Spireas, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, at
*23-24.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(4); Eickmeyer v. Comm’r, 580 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1978).
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roots in Gregory v. Helvering,46 a 1935 Supreme Court case, though its concept dates
back to at least the 1920s.47 In Gregory, a taxpayer satisfied the literal elements of
a reorganization Code provision when she created a new corporation to which she
transferred assets tax-free from her existing corporation, and then subsequently
dissolved the new corporation, thereby distributing those assets to her. 48 The shortThe Supreme Court
lived corporation had no other business purpose.49
acknowledged that the taxpayer had satisfied the elements of the provision, but asked
“whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute
intended.”50
Although the Board of Tax Appeals found for Gregory because “[a] statute so
meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy,
and leaves the small interstices for judicial consideration,” 51 the Supreme Court
disagreed.52 Because it viewed Gregory’s use of the Code provision as “elaborate
and devious” and outside of its congressionally-intended purpose, the Court denied
her its benefits, declaring that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.” 53
The Gregory decision helped create “a welter of rules and extrastatutory
standards” that courts apply to tax cases.54 Outside of substance over form cases, the
Supreme Court has typically applied statutory language rather than judicially-created
doctrines.55 Lower courts followed the Supreme Court’s non-textualist lead in tax
cases.56 The substance over form doctrine and its fellow anti-abuse doctrines are
confusing, often applied in combination,57 and applied inconsistently,58 but have

46. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
47. Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Substance Over Form: The Cornerstone of Our Tax System or
a Lethal Weapon in the IRS’s Arsenal? 8 AKRON TAX J. 91, 91 (1991).
48. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467. The series of transactions resulted in the taxpayer receiving capital
gain treatment.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 469.
51. Gregory v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932), rev’d sub nom. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d
809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
52. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
53. Id.
54. Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 863; see also Boris I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the
Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 HOW. L.J. 693, 695 (1978) (The substance over form
doctrine and other anti-abuse doctrines are part of “presuppositions or criteria [that] are so pervasive
that, in combination, they resemble a preamble to the Code, describing the framework within which all
statutory provisions are to function.”).
55. See Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-Form Doctrines
in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 739-43 (2003).
56. See generally Daniel M. Schneider, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal Tax Cases Decided by
Trial Courts, 1993-2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35 (2009). For a discussion
of how often the Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to comment on the efficacy of the
substance over form doctrine, see Madison, supra note 55, at 739, 739 n.305.
57. Bittker, supra note 54, at 707.
58. See Madison, supra note 55, at 722 (“The various courts of appeals have not agreed on which
substance-over-form doctrines apply, how the doctrines apply, or when the doctrines apply.”). For a
discussion of court decisions, see id. at 722-38.
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become commonplace.59
Additionally, tax-abuse doctrines are typically employed by the government
against taxpayers.60 While a taxpayer is generally stuck with the form she chooses,
the government has the opportunity to convince a court that it should be allowed to
recharacterize the taxpayer’s transaction.61 Ultimately, a court that engages in a
substance over form analysis may not approach the case neutrally; the doctrine may
serve as the conclusion.62 Had Gregory been decided differently, it would be “hard
to imagine that any judge would feel licensed to follow a pure gut response in
deciding a tax dispute.”63
The doctrine has its critics and has become a topic of debate in recent court
decisions.64 Rather than “sav[ing] the world from manipulative taxpayers,” the
application of the substance over form doctrine unnecessarily complicates tax law.65
Because Congress has the ability to amend the Code in response to unfavorable court
decisions that result from its statute writing, “[t]he sort of ‘creative’ jurisprudence
found in the cases on form and substance cannot, in the end, be justified by any
demonstrable needs of sound tax administration.” 66 In other words, it is Congress’s
job to define the nature of Code provisions and draft requirements that clearly reflect
that nature. Congress does not benefit from “judicial attempts to make the law
‘better’” in individuals’ tax cases.67 Indeed, hardly anyone does.68
III. THE CASES
This section highlights some recent substance over form decisions, the two §
1235 cases relied on in the Cooper arguments, and the Cooper decision itself.
59. See, e.g., In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “courts
should not elevate form over substance by rewarding taxpayers who have engaged in transactions that
lack any purpose save that of tax savings.”); Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir.
1971) (denying taxpayers’ transaction preferential tax treatment when “such a result would completely
thwart the Congressional policy to tax transactional realities.”); Tracinda Corp. v. Comm’r, 111 T.C.
315, 326 (1998) (As a general rule, the Tax Court employs the substance over form doctrine when “the
substance of the transaction differs from its form,” but “[i]f substance follows form then [it] will respect
the form chosen by the taxpayer.”).
60. See Schneider, supra note 56, at 39.
61. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) (“A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization
for his affairs as he may choose and having elected to do some business as a corporation, he must accept
the tax disadvantages.”).
62. See Philip Sancilio, Clarifying (Or Is It Codifying) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions,
Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 142 (2013); Knight & Knight, supra
note 47, at 106.
63. Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 882.
64. See infra Section III.A.
65. See Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 879; see also Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying”
Judicial Anti-Abuse Tax Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 595 (2014) (referring to the substance over
form doctrine as “amorphous.”).
66. Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 881.
67. Id.
68. Tax lawyers, of course, benefit from the added confusion. See id. at 883 (“The heavier the
layers of judicial divination superimposed on the Internal Revenue Code, the richer tax lawyers are apt
to get.”).
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A. Recent Substance over Form Decisions
1. Summa Holdings & Benenson
In Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court’s denial of relief to taxpayers who utilized complex Code provisions to lower
their taxes.69 The purpose of the provisions at issue in Summa is, like many of the
Code’s provisions, to lower taxes.70 Up front, the Sixth Circuit criticized the
Commissioner’s reliance on the substance over form doctrine:
Each word of the “substance-over-form doctrine,” at least as the Commissioner has
used it here, should give pause. If the government can undo transactions that the
terms of the Code expressly authorize, it’s fair to ask what the point of making these
terms accessible to the taxpayer and binding on the tax collector is. “Form” is
“substance” when it comes to law. The words of law (its form) determine content
(its substance). How odd, then, to permit the tax collector to reverse the sequence—
to allow him to determine the substance of a law and to make it govern “over” the
written form of the law—and to call it a “doctrine” no less.71

All parties in Summa Holdings acknowledged and agreed that the taxpayers
followed the Code.72 “If this case dealt with any other title of the United States Code,
we would stop there, end the suspense, and rule for [the taxpayers].”73 But, the Sixth
Circuit continued, “when it comes to the Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner
claims a right to reclassify Code-compliant transactions under the ‘substance-overform’ doctrine in order to respect ‘overarching . . . principles of federal taxation.’” 74
The Sixth Circuit drew a crucial distinction in the doctrine between reclassifying
transactions to reflect a taxpayer’s economic reality and reclassifying transactions in
such a way that the statute is recharacterized.75 To be sure, the court acknowledged
the need for the substance over form doctrine when it comes to squirrely taxpayer
behavior like calling income something other than income to avoid paying taxes. 76
However, the Sixth Circuit cautioned that the Code is the law and if the Service
disagrees with the result when the Code is followed,77 the Service cannot unilaterally
change the law; that is Congress’s job.78
69. Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2017). The taxpayer utilized a
DISC to increase Roth IRA accounts past individual contribution limits.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 784.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Brief of Comm’r-Appellee at 39, 41, Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d
779 (6th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1712), 2017 WL 4944289).
75. See id. at 785.
76. Id.
77. This sentiment assumes that the taxpayer followed the Code legitimately, not a “labeling-game
sham or defied economic reality.” Id. at 786.
78. See id. at 790. The Sixth Circuit mused that “[p]erhaps the Commissioner’s approach made
some sense decades ago, when the Code was simpler, and before Congress decided to pursue a wide
range of policy goals through a complicated set of tax credits, deductions, and savings accounts.” Id. at
789.
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The First Circuit decided Benenson v. Commissioner in April of 2018. The facts
are similar to those in Summa Holdings but the parties are different. The First
Circuit, therefore, made its own decision based on an “independent determination of
the issues.”79 Like the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit reversed the Tax Court and
held for the taxpayer, concluding that “the transaction [did] not violate the plain
intent of the relevant statutes.”80
The First Circuit defined its approach to the substance over form doctrine in
Benenson as a tool of statutory interpretation.81 The Code is a collection of statutes,
and the doctrine “helps courts read tax statutes in a way that makes their technical
language conform more precisely with Congressional intent.” 82 The First Circuit,
therefore, began its analysis by looking at the Code provisions implicated. 83 From
there, the court concluded that the taxpayers did something that the Code allows, and
that if what the taxpayers did is not in line with what Congress intended, then it is up
to Congress to fix it, not the courts. 84
2. Mazzei
After the Sixth Circuit decided Summa Holdings, and just before the First Circuit
decided Benenson, the Tax Court decided Mazzei v. Commissioner.85 The Service
argued the substance over form doctrine and the Tax Court agreed. 86 The majority
discussed the Sixth Circuit’s Summa Holdings opinion but said that its holding did
not apply in Mazzei’s case because Mazzei merely labeled his transaction something
that it was not, and therefore, the IRS was within its rights to argue substance over
form.87
The dissent disagreed. Judge Holmes considered the facts of Mazzei to be
“nearly identical” to the facts in Summa Holdings, and argued that in light of the
Sixth Circuit’s reversal of Summa Holdings, the Tax Court should have reconsidered
its analysis.88 The dissent called out the approach used by the majority—“perhaps
more common in tax law than in any other legal specialty”—as wrong because it
“abandon[s] general principles of statutory construction in favor of using judge-made
doctrines that undermine or ignore the text of the Code to recast transactions to avoid

79. Benenson v. Comm’r, 887 F.3d 511, 516 (1st Cir. 2018).
80. Id. at 523.
81. Because “[t]he federal tax system is, and always has been, based on statute[,]” the First Circuit
opined that the substance over form doctrine, as a common law tax doctrine, “can thus perhaps best be
thought of as a tool of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 517 (quoting Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v.
United States, 844 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (quotation marks removed).
82. Id. (quoting Dewees v. Comm’r, 870 F.2d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 1989)) (quotation marks removed).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 523. Reasonable minds can differ, of course. The dissent would have affirmed because
“Congress ha[d] never blessed such an arrangement” as the taxpayers engaged in “and the transaction . .
. flout[ed] Congress's intent to limit Roth IRA contributions.” Id. at 523 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
85. Mazzei v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. No. 7 (2018).
86. See id. at 55-56.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 63 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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‘abuse.’”89
The dissent agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the substance over form doctrine
is correctly applied in situations where taxpayers attempt to get beneficial tax
treatment by deviously calling something something that it is not, but did not think
that the facts of Mazzei suggested devious actions.90 While agreeing that a dogowner cannot benefit from a statute offering subsidies for cow-owners simply by
calling his dog a cow, Judge Holmes asserted that “rich people buying cows they
don’t otherwise need in order to get the cow subsidies isn’t the same thing.” 91
B. Section 1235 Cases
As previously discussed, if a taxpayer inventor retains substantial rights over a
patent or transfers substantial rights to a related party, then he has not given away
the patent and will be denied § 1235 benefits.92 The question presented is whether a
taxpayer, despite satisfying the provision’s elements, including its control
requirement, may be denied § 1235’s preferential tax benefits if the government
argues that he controls the transferee corporation. There are only a handful of § 1235
cases that discuss control under the “all substantial rights” element. 93 While the
taxpayer in Cooper lost his case, the taxpayers in both Charlson v. United States and
Lee v. United States were granted capital gains treatment under § 1235 despite
similar issues of control.
1. Charlson v. United States
In Charlson, the Court of Claims was primarily concerned with whether
Charlson effectively controlled the corporation to which he sold his patents when the
corporation was composed of four of his friends and business associates, including
his personal attorney, and the sole reason for the corporation’s creation was to
purchase the taxpayer’s patents.94 Although the four individuals had “diverse
business talents,” when the corporation decided to sell the patents a few years later,
one of the primary reasons was because “[t]he patents had proved to be of great value
and their successful exploitation was beyond [the corporation]’s fairly amateur
capabilities.”95 Charlson was not a shareholder, but he advised the corporation, was
“of aid” to his friends, and “explain[ed] the technical difficulties and advantages of
[his inventions] to the prospective licensees.”96
The Commissioner argued that Charlson’s royalty payments were ordinary

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id.
See supra Section II.B.2.
Perhaps this is because of § 1235’s separate control requirement.
Charlson v. United States, 525 F.2d 1046, 1048 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
Id. at 1049, 1051.
Id.
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income because his friends’ corporation was either a sham corporation 97 and/or it
was controlled by Charlson. 98 Charlson, on the other hand, argued that the
corporation “conducted its own business to advance its own interests without outside
intervention or interference.”99
While the court determined that it was possible for a taxpayer to control a
transferee corporation despite satisfying § 1235(c)’s specific control requirement, it
held that Charlson did not control his friends’ corporation. 100 The Court of Claims
acknowledged that “it [was] . . . apparent that the choice of shareholders was greatly
influenced by Mr. Charlson’s friendship . . . [and] that they would be less likely to
do things adverse to his interests than a large unknown company would.” 101
Everyone involved in the corporation, including the shareholders, benefited
from the “mutual advantage” of Charlson’s involvement in the corporation.102
Although his relationships with these four individuals “existed for many years” and
“[t]hese circumstances ma[d]e more probable, whether pursuant to some mutual
understanding or not, the existence of retained control,” the court ultimately decided
that “this probability [fell] far short of proof.” 103
2. Lee v. United States
The facts of Lee involve two coworkers on the night shift who designed a tool
together.104 One of the men continued working at his job, the other, Lee, left to
pursue the invention’s business as a sole proprietorship. 105 The business was
lucrative and Lee decided to incorporate to protect the business and sought to do so
under § 1235 to reap its benefits.106 Lee transferred the patent to a new corporation
composed of himself (24%) and his old coworker (76%). 107 Lee was president of the
new corporation and on the board of directors.108
The government argued that Lee had not transferred “all substantial rights”
because he was in control of the new corporation. 109 The court interpreted the
government’s argument as suggesting that any transfer to a closed corporation would
destroy § 1235 treatment, but congressional intent does not support that position. 110
The court ultimately held that even though the men knew each other well over many
97. The sham doctrine is one of the anti-abuse doctrines often intermingled with substance over
form. The government’s “sham corporation” argument in Charlson is beyond the scope of this Note.
The court did not agree with it anyhow. Id. at 1057.
98. Id. at 1052.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1055.
101. Id. at 1054-55.
102. Id. at 1055. An inventor’s expertise likely helps maintain and increase share value.
103. Id. at 1054.
104. Lee v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 945, 946 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
105. Id. at 947.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 948.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 950.
110. See id.
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years, Lee complied with the statute and “[t]here was no evidence presented which
suggested Lee was otherwise [aside from his 24% vote] able to force the other
stockholders or directors to do his bidding.”111
C. Cooper v. Commissioner
1. Facts and Procedural History
Cooper is an inventor.112 He had an arrangement with a licensing company
whereby he legitimately received capital gain treatment on royalties received from
his patents, but the relationship went sour with a money dispute and subsequent
litigation.113 Cooper thus had to find another equally beneficial home for his patents.
He sought an attorney’s advice before he, his wife, his wife’s sister (Walters), and a
friend (Coulter) incorporated a new company with the purpose of purchasing and
exploiting Cooper’s patents.114 Cooper and his wife owned only 24% of the stock to
stay within § 1235’s requirements.115 The Commissioner determined that Cooper’s
royalties were ordinary income because he effectively controlled the corporation. 116
The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit agreed.117
Because Walters and Coulter were the majority shareholders and directors of the
corporation, the Tax Court analyzed their roles and actions in determining whether
Cooper retained control of the corporation.118 The Tax Court took into account the
directors’ lack of “patent, engineering, or other such skills” in its decision that they
were not “particularly valuable” while relegating to a footnote the women’s degrees
in finance and economics, and accomplishments in professional fields, including
Coulter’s ownership of a company.119
The Tax Court gave weight to Cooper’s previous failed business relationship as
evidence that he chose shareholder directors whom he knew and purportedly could
control.120 Coulter and Walters testified that they relied on the expertise of Cooper,
as well as the corporation’s attorneys and accountants. 121 After determining that
Coulter and Walters did not act on their own, the Tax Court concluded that Cooper
effectively controlled them and the corporation.122
111. Id.
112. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2017).
113. Id. at 1088-89.
114. Id. at 1089.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1091.
118. See Cooper v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 194, 201-02 (2014).
119. Id. at 198 n.10, 211. There is no requirement in the Code that a transferee corporation’s
directors have previous knowledge of patents. There is no requirement in the Code that a transferee
corporation’s directors be men.
120. Id. at 211.
121. Id. at 212. Again, there is no requirement in the Code that a transferee corporation’s directors
have previous knowledge of how best to run a patent corporation. To say otherwise would discourage
newcomers to the endeavor.
122. Id. at 213.
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2. The Opinions
a. Majority
Early in its opinion, the Ninth Circuit invoked the substance over form doctrine
as “[a] bedrock principle of tax law.” 123 The court then expressly adopted the
Charlson court’s stance that “[i]f a patent holder exercises control over the recipient
corporation such that, in effect, there has not been a transfer of all substantial rights
in the subject patent(s), then the requirements of § 1235 are not met, even if the
documents describing the transfer formally assign all substantial rights.” 124
Next, despite the fact that “mere influence” will not defeat § 1235, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that “effective control” will defeat it because the taxpayer “did not
effectively transfer all substantial rights to the patent(s).” 125 The smoking gun for
the majority was the corporation’s transfer of patents to Cooper for no
consideration.126 Because “the right to retrieve ownership . . . is a substantial right,”
the Ninth Circuit held that “the Tax Court did not clearly err in ruling that Mr. Cooper
did not transfer ‘all substantial rights’ to the patents.”127
The majority adopted the Tax Court’s findings that Walters and Coulter
“exercised no independent judgment,” did not “act in their best interests as
shareholders,” and that decisions about the patents were made by Cooper.128 In light
of the fact that the corporation returned patents, the Tax Court’s findings supported
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “there is no reason to think that [Walters and
Coulter] would have objected to the rescission of any other transfer of patents.” 129
b. Dissent
While the majority contended that the correct question was “whether . . . Mr.
Cooper retained the ability to retrieve the patents at will,” the dissent suggested “that
[the court] must ask whether, in theory, [the corporation] could have declined to
transfer the patents back to Mr. Cooper.”130 Judge Kleinfeld’s dissent primarily
disagreed with the majority’s definition of control. “The majority err[ed] . . . because
it dilute[d] the meaning of ‘control’ from the ability to compel a result to something
less and indeterminate.”131 By diluting the meaning of control, the majority’s
opinion is “at odds” with the authority it cites, including the Charlson decision and
the Treasury Regulations on point.132
123. Cooper v. Comm’r, 877 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[C]onsiderable legal authority
supports [the court’s] conclusion that, when determining whether there has been a transfer of all
substantial rights, we must look beyond the bare form of the transaction.”).
124. Id. at 1092.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1093.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1092-93.
129. Id. at 1093.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1096 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
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In arguing that Cooper had less control over his patents’ transferee corporation
than Charlson had, Judge Kleinfeld made the astute observation that in Charlson, the
taxpayer had power over the four shareholders in the transferee corporation because
they were his employees and one was his personal attorney.133 “As such, Charlson
could fire each of them if he disliked how they voted,” and yet, Charlson won his
case.134 While both Charlson and Cooper’s holding corporations looked to them for
recommendations and guidance about their patents, the Cooper court viewed the
arrangement as Cooper exercising control, whereas the Charlson court saw the
arrangement as mutually beneficial to Charlson and the corporation’s shareholders.
Because “influence is all Cooper had,” the dissent suggested that Cooper’s case is
more similar to the Lee case.135 In Lee, control was defined as “whether the taxpayer
can ‘force’ the transferee to do his bidding.” 136 There is no evidence in the record
that Cooper had such force.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Key Difference Between Cooper and Charlson/Lee
The facts of Cooper are similar to the facts in Charlson and Lee in many
respects. First, the corporations to which all three inventors transferred their patents
were created specifically for that purpose. An indication that the substance of a
transaction does not match its form is when the transaction lacks a business purpose,
thereby demonstrating that the taxpayer designed a transaction merely for tax
avoidance. Holding corporations are common in the patent world, however, and
confer non-tax business benefits. An inventor transferring a patent to a holding
corporation that was created specifically for receiving the patent is an insufficient
reason to apply the substance over form doctrine.
Second, although Charlson was not a shareholder and Cooper and Lee were, all
of the other shareholders of the transferee corporations were close friends of the
inventors. There is no evidence that any of the shareholders had knowledge of the
patent business, but this was only raised as an issue in Cooper. There, both the Tax
Court and the Ninth Circuit seemed bothered by the lack of patent experience of
Walters and Coulter despite their business and professional experiences. The Cooper
court was additionally concerned about whether Cooper chose his shareholders so
that he could control them, especially considering the failure of his previous business
relationship. Section 1235 does not place requirements on the nature of an inventor’s
relationship with the transferee corporation’s shareholders, so long as they are not
related parties under the provision. It is logical that Cooper, after a failed business
relationship, would choose to enter a new endeavor with people he knew and trusted.
Charlson also chose his friends, and Lee chose his old coworker who invented the
patent with him. There is little logic in assuming that Cooper’s interest in working
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 1096-97.
Id.
Id.
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with people he knew somehow equated to his ability to control them.
Third, the corporations relied on the inventors for their expertise, guidance, and
knowledge of their patents. Involving the inventor with decisions about his invention
is common practice and ideal for the invention, the inventor, and for the holding
corporation. The inventor’s knowledge and expertise undoubtedly increase the
patent’s value, which in turn increases stock value. Whereas this arrangement was
viewed as typical and beneficial in Charlson, the Cooper court imputed nefarious
intent by using the shareholders’ reliance on Cooper’s expertise and guidance as
evidence that he was controlling them.
The distinction between the cases may be whether the government argued
substance over form.137 When the Charlson and Lee courts analyzed the issue of
control, they concluded that the taxpayer inventors were permissibly operating under
§ 1235; when the Cooper court analyzed similar transactions, however, it concluded
that the substance over form doctrine mandated a different result. The Cooper court
distinguished Cooper from Charlson because the corporation in Charlson “never
returned patents to the inventor without consideration.” 138 However, as discussed
below, the application of the substance over form doctrine erroneously shifted the
court’s focus of the § 1235 analysis from the taxpayer to the corporation’s business
decisions.139 Its conclusion was, therefore, speculative and tainted by the doctrine.
While courts do have a duty to examine the circumstances behind a taxpayer’s
challenged transactions, the Cooper result suggests that the substance over form
doctrine has the (perhaps unintentional) effect of acting in a conclusory manner. In
other words, after deciding that the substance over form doctrine is applicable to a
transaction, a court might support the doctrine rather than undertake a neutral
analysis of the case.
B. Consequences of the Cooper Decision
The Tax Code has hundreds of provisions. The Code informs taxpayers of their
duties and allows them to structure their transactions to their benefit. Taxpayers pay
taxes; the Code puts them on notice of the tax consequences of their actions.
While there will always be room to argue in the gray spaces of the Code, the
Cooper decision adds unnecessary uncertainty for inventors.140 By erroneously
applying the substance over form doctrine, the Cooper court redefined the control
requirement of § 1235. Congress included § 1235(c) to assuage its concerns about
inventor control in holding corporations, but the Cooper court seemed to not be
137. Granted, the fact that the corporation gave back some patents does suggest some indicia of
improper control, but the corporation’s directors may have transferred the patents for many reasons—
perhaps for good business relationship reasons, perhaps because they exercised terrible business
judgment—but the transfer is not necessarily indicative of effective control by the inventor. Because it
could have happened for other reasons, this Author is under the opinion that the taxpayer should have
received the benefit of the doubt.
138. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1093 (majority opinion). The transfer of an asset carries with it its own
taxation consequences for both the corporation and the individual. See I.R.C. §§ 301, 311 (2012).
139. See infra Section IV.B.
140. Section 1235 is arguably not very gray.
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satisfied with Congress’s method. Because Cooper so clearly met the statute’s
control requirement, the Cooper court had to wrestle control into another of § 1235’s
elements. Although the all substantial rights element is not about control per se, as
evidenced in its corresponding regulations, the court made it about control for the
purposes of denying Cooper § 1235’s benefits.
This misguided focus took the attention away from the inventor and whether he
retained rights, and instead looked at the corporation and its actions. It seems that
the Cooper court made its decision about whether the taxpayer gave away all
substantial rights by analyzing the transferee corporation’s business decision. 141 The
dissent’s definition of control in the § 1235 context was better: the question is not
whether a corporation took an action; the question is whether the corporation could
have refused to take the action.142
Ultimately, the Cooper decision may deter inventors from pursuing § 1235’s tax
benefits and the incentive to invent, move, and share patents may be lessened.143 For
rules to work effectively, taxpayers must be able to follow them. After Cooper,
inventors may be unsure of how to best comply with the requirement regarding
control. Although the Code and the regulations lay out the parameters of the
requirement, Cooper demonstrates that an inventor is not necessarily safe if she
follows those parameters; rather, she must show no appearance of control as well.
The easiest way to satisfy this would be to sell her patent to an unknown third party,
but the Code does not require that. 144
Regarding control, § 1235 tells us that the inventor cannot own more than 25%
of the corporation to which the patents are transferred and that the other shareholders
cannot be “related parties.” What do Charlson, Lee, and Cooper add to our
understanding? It is acceptable to start a corporation for the purpose of transferring
your patents, to be a shareholder in that corporation, and to have your closest friends
and employees as shareholders and corporate directors. It is also acceptable to advise
the corporation. It is not acceptable, however, to do those things if the corporation
makes a business decision that a court would not have made.
As Judge Kleinfeld pointed out, “Congress thought it was a good idea to give
patent holders a tax benefit, but the majority's decision creates so much risk of
litigation that it may be a bad idea to claim the benefit.” 145 Of course, it is not so
clear after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act whether, or for how long, Congress will
continue to give patent holders a tax benefit.

141. An exploration of whether this might be a modified form of veil piercing is outside the scope of
this Note.
142. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1097 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
143. There is evidence that tax incentives may, indeed, affect the incentive to invent. See Ufuk
Akcigit et al., Taxation and Innovation in the 20th Century 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24982, 2018).
144. This might not be the best course of action for the patent’s future, either.
145. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1099 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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C. Suggestions
1. Substance over Form Doctrine Should be Applied More Narrowly
Anti-abuse doctrines can be useful and the IRS should have the protection of the
substance over form doctrine when a taxpayer blatantly disregards the requirements
of the Code. The doctrine can no doubt help protect against untoward taxpayer
schemes.146 The doctrine should not, however, be applied in any circumstance in
which the government merely does not like the result of a transaction.
The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Commissioner’s substance over form
argument, interpreted the doctrine as “look[ing] beyond the bare form of the
transaction.”147 A court should, of course, look beyond the bare form, but the
doctrine implies something more than a look. The doctrine implies that if the
government is applying it, something is amiss. This is faulty logic because the
government applies the doctrine when it does not like the result of a taxpayer’s
transactions, but not liking the result of a transaction does not mean that the
transaction occurred outside of the legitimate boundaries of the Code.
The First Circuit’s application of the substance over form doctrine is a better
standard. Even if the doctrine is argued in a case where the government merely does
not like the outcome, it will not automatically weigh against the taxpayer if a court
treats the doctrine as a tool of statutory interpretation. Cooper may have followed
Charlson and Lee under this standard.
Moreover, the substance over form doctrine should generally be applied more
narrowly. The doctrine should be reserved for those times when a taxpayer truly
mischaracterized or mislabeled something in search of a benefit to which the
taxpayer was not entitled. A taxpayer should not be able to label their dog a cow in
order to receive cow subsidies. But the doctrine should not apply if the government
disagrees with a dog owner receiving cow subsidies after she purchases cows in order
to receive the subsidies.
Because § 1235’s elements are clearly defined, it is difficult to imagine a
scenario where the substance over form doctrine’s application would be necessary to
defeat a taxpayer’s inappropriate use of the provision. The statute itself is sufficient
to strike down the use of § 1235 for a taxpayer who mischaracterizes or mislabels
his transactions, or otherwise attempts to bamboozle the IRS. In light of § 1235’s
clarity, substance over form is an unnecessary doctrine. 148
The Code has grown.149 Of the many provisions Congress has added are a
handful of specific situations in which the IRS is given the express authority to

146. See Mazzei v. Comm’r, 150 T.C. 7, 78 (2018) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If a kennel and a
taxpayer agree that a tail is a leg, a taxpayer might say he has a five-legged dog. But unless the Code or
regulations tell us differently, his dog still has only four legs for tax law.”).
147. Cooper, 877 F.3d at 1091 (majority opinion).
148. Because comprehensive Code revisions and additions have replaced piecemeal common law,
the use of judicially-created doctrines may no longer be appropriate in tax cases at all. See Madison,
supra note 55, at 716.
149. During the days of Gregory, the Code fit on 400 pages; it now takes over 36,000. Id. at 745.
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recharacterize transactions using substance over form principles.150 On the one hand,
the fact that Congress has built substance over form into the Code lends support to
its use generally. On the other hand, the fact that Congress has only built it into
certain provisions and not as an overarching principle applicable to the whole Code
implies that Congress does not intend for the doctrine to be applied willy-nilly.
2. Congress Should Clearly Speak to Inventions and Capital Gains Treatment
Section 1235 was almost repealed.151 By expanding § 1221, the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act specifically excluded the income from the sale or exchange of a patent from
receiving capital gain treatment under general characterization principles,152 and the
House’s accompanying repeal of § 1235’s special characterization rule would have
closed the door to capital gain income for inventors. Is this what Congress intended?
In light of the Code’s general pronouncement that self-made goods are not capital
assets, it would not be nonsensical for Congress to make this change. If Congress
intended to close the door to capital gains income for inventors, it needs to remove
the ambiguity. One way to make this intention clear is to redefine the definition of
“holder” in § 1235 to exclude the inventor.153
It makes better sense, however, to encourage invention by offering tax benefits
to inventors. “It is widely accepted by economists and nations alike that innovation
drives economic prosperity.”154 The recent tax bill, however, shows a decisive move
away from encouraging innovation. Attempting to stimulate the economy by
offering tax breaks for tangible machines and manufacturing equipment instead of
innovation and invention was simply “short-sighted.”155
Of the many ways Congress chose to actively discourage innovation in America,
it made the above changes to § 1235, eliminated the research and development tax
deduction, and failed to adopt a patent box.156 Innovation may suffer and/or move
offshore as a result.157 While the United States has fallen from its position “at the
forefront of innovation policy,” many other nations are employing strategies to
increase innovation, including tax incentives to become more competitive. 158
150. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269, 446, 482; Madison, supra note 55, at 746.
151. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, D(13) (2017) (discussing § 3312 of the House Bill).
152. Id. at D(12) (discussing § 3311 of the House Bill).
153. See Geier, supra note 28.
154. Adam E. Szymanski, Make America Innovate Again: Construing Patent Box Proposals in View
of a Policy Mix Approach, 7 Cybaris An Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 249, 252 (2016).
155. Jeffrey A. Maine, Tax Cuts and American Innovation, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SCHOOL OF LAW
(July 27, 2018), https://mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty/tax-cuts-and-american-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/85U5-P4M4].
156. Id.
157. Id. An empirical study of state-level taxation shows innovation responds negatively to taxation.
See Akcigit, supra note 143, at 34 (“[B]oth personal and corporate taxes matter for innovation . . . [and]
[t]he quantity, quality, and the location of innovation are all affected by the tax system and the effects
are quantitatively important.”).
158. Szymanski, supra note 154, at 253; see also Maine, supra note 155 (“[T]he U.S. has dropped
among nations from #1 in 1990 in terms of R&D tax incentive generosity, to #25 in 2016.”). The
president of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation in Washington, D.C. “see[s] no
evidence to suggest that this trend [of dropping in the innovation index] will not continue,” noting that
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V. CONCLUSION
Cooper was denied capital gain treatment on his patent royalty income despite
following the Code’s requirements under § 1235. The overreaching application of
the substance over form doctrine led the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit to the
conclusion that Cooper effectively controlled the corporation to which he transferred
his patents despite satisfying Congress’s control requirement.
While the substance over form doctrine may have had its use when the Code
was young, it is now applied too widely and at the expense of taxpayers. A
consistent, functional approach is necessary, with a uniform definition of what the
doctrine is and when it should be applied. If it is to be used, the substance over form
doctrine should be reserved for those situations when a taxpayer mischaracterizes or
mislabels a transaction to receive an illegitimate benefit. The fact is that the Code
may bestow benefits on taxpayers that the government does not agree with, but this
does not mean that the substance over form doctrine should swoop in against the
taxpayer.
In the end, taxpayers have a duty to pay taxes, but they do not have a duty to pay
more than their due. Taxpayers require clarity in order to know the taxation
consequences of how they arrange their affairs. Although Congress needs to resolve
the Code’s internal inconsistency in its treatment of income from the sale or
exchange of patents resulting from the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 1235 and its
elements provide the clarity necessary for an inventor to receive its benefits. The
Cooper decision unnecessarily complicates the provision’s requirements.
When the Code allows taxpayers to structure their transactions to benefit them,
the Service must accept that reality. If it is displeased with how a taxpayer follows
the Code, it can issue regulations or wait for Congress to fix the problem. It should
not, however, use the courts to take its displeasure out on taxpayers.

“[o]ther nations have responded with smart, well-funded innovation policies like better R&D tax
incentives, more government funding for research, [and] more funding for technology
commercialization initiatives.” Michelle Jamrisko & Wei Lu, The U.S. Drops Out of the Top 10 in
Innovation Rating, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0122/south-korea-tops-global-innovation-ranking-again-as-u-s-falls.

